Fraud: Implications for individuals and Nation States

Disclaimer:

This briefing is intended as an outline compilation of fraud in various contexts, setting out the implications for individuals in public office who become aware of fraudulent activity, and for Nation States. The principles set out herein derive from treaties (including the VCLT), customary international law, ICL statutes and jurisprudence, and general principles of law.

Outcomes are highly fact-specific and context-dependent — for example, as between public international law and transnational commercial or criminal matters, and according to whether the fraud in question rises to the level of international crimes or remains a matter of domestic constitutional law. Enforcement commonly occurs through national courts, with international tribunals intervening in cases of grave violation.

For specific scenarios, readers should consult the applicable treaties, domestic implementing legislation, or qualified legal advisers. Specific context relating to the Claimant's claims of harm, loss, and injury arising from the Executive Power and Imperial Crown being held de facto since 1 August 1714 is provided in Section 6.

Editorial note:

The use and spelling of certain words in their original form is maintained for historical continuity, e.g. intrust rather than modern use of entrust, readers are advised to refer to the Glossary for specific meanings.

0. Executive Summary

The purpose of this article is to explain what international law says happens when a government has been operating without lawful authority, and what the personal consequences are for officials who know this and continue anyway.  Those general principles, together with Treaty Law, Complicity/Aiding and Abetting are explained in sections 1‑3.

Section 4 introduces the implications when the Executive Power is held de facto, meaning that an individual or group of individuals are exercising derivative power in practice without having the legal right to do so. i.e. acting in a Public Office with no Colour of Right.

Section 5 summarises those principles of international law once an individual is aware and continues to participate.

Section 6 applies those international law principles directly to the principal claim by the author, that the Imperial Crown and Executive Power intrust to the Monarch has been de facto and illegitimate since 1 August 1714.

This has explicit relevance to the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (New Zealand).  If the Crown's executive power was already de facto and illegitimate from 1714, then those who purported to sign and administer the 1840 Treaty did so without valid legal authority.  Those involved in the signing of the Treaty using the Colour of Office, and those who have subsequently continued to act in any manner under the Colour of Office without Colour of Right are deemed to hold personal criminal responsibility under International Criminal Law (see section 4.1).  This emphasises the importance of placing on notice, those using or deriving their authority from a de facto Imperial Crown and Executive Power.

In the context of He Wakaputanga 1835 (Declaration of Independence), this is classified as usurpation (see section 6.1) of a de jure Constitutional body.

1. Fraud in Treaty Law (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – VCLT 1969)

The key provision is Article 49 VCLT:

“If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.”

1. Fraudulent conduct typically involves wilful misrepresentation or concealment of material facts intended to deceive and induce consent that would not otherwise have been given. It does not require defining “fraud” exhaustively but focuses on acts that vitiate consent.

2. The affected state can choose to invalidate the treaty (or its participation) as a whole or in part.

3. This reflects the broader principle of good faith (pacta sunt servanda and bona fides) in international law. Fraud undermines the validity of agreements.

   
   

Knowledge/continued participation: Once a state becomes aware of fraud during or after negotiations, continuing performance or failing to invoke invalidity promptly may affect its ability to rely on the fraud (e.g., via acquiescence or estoppel).  However, the primary remedy is invocation of invalidity rather than ongoing liability.

2. General Principles of Law (Recognised by International Courts)

Fraud is antithetical to good faith and law itself.  International courts and tribunals (e.g., ICJ, arbitral bodies) apply principles such as:

1. Fraud vitiates consent and renders acts or rights unenforceable (“fraud unravels all”)

2. A party cannot benefit from its own fraud or claim rights procured by fraud.

3. Estoppel and good faith: A state or party aware of fraud (or potential fraud) that continues to participate or acquiesces may be estopped from later challenging the arrangement or claiming relief.  This promotes stability and prevents abuse.

These are “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations [sic — American spelling as in the original]” (ICJ Statute Art. 38(1)(c)). Source: United Nations - Office of Legal Affairs: https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf 

3. Knowledge of Fraud and Continued Participation (Complicity/Aiding and Abetting)

This is most developed in international criminal law for serious crimes (e.g., under the Rome Statute of the ICC, ad hoc tribunals like ICTY/ICTR):

1. Aiding and abetting (or complicity): Liability arises if a person provides substantial assistance (or a significant contribution) to a crime, with knowledge of the essential elements of the principal offence.
   

2. Mens  rea (mental element): Knowledge that one's acts assist the crime is often sufficient (ad hoc tribunals). The ICC requires “purpose” in some formulations (Art. 25(3)(c)), but knowledge standards apply in practice for many modes of liability.  Mere awareness of a risk may not suffice without knowledge.
   

3. Continued participation: Once aware of fraud or a related crime (e.g., in financial crime, corruption, or sanctions evasion), ongoing involvement can constitute aiding/abetting if it substantially contributes. Omissions (e.g., failure to prevent when under a duty) can also trigger liability under command/superior responsibility. Examples:

   1. Knowingly facilitating fraudulent transactions,

   2. money laundering proceeds of fraud,

   3. making financial contribution to a fraudulent individual/body/State (these may be disguised as fees, taxes or claimed as legitimate transactions by the fraudulent party), or

   4. continuing business dealings while aware of corruption.
      

4. In state responsibility (ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts): A state aiding or assisting another state in an internationally wrongful act (which could include fraudulent conduct breaching obligations) is responsible if it does so with knowledge of the circumstances and the act would be wrongful if committed by the assisting state (Art. 16).
   

5. Corporate or individual context (e.g., in transnational fraud, FCPA, or sanctions): National laws often implement international standards.  Continued participation after awareness can lead to civil (tort) or criminal liability for complicity, knowing receipt of benefits, or conspiracy. International cooperation frameworks (e.g., UNCAC for corruption, FATF for financial crime) emphasise prevention, detection, and mutual assistance.
   

6. International commercial arbitration and contracts: Fraud or corruption can lead to invalidity of contracts/awards on public policy grounds. Tribunals apply good faith and may refuse enforcement.
   

7. Consumer/financial fraud: OECD and other bodies promote cross-border cooperation against deceptive practices, with principles favouring detection, redress, and international enforcement cooperation.
   

8. Human rights/investment law: Fraud in procurement or investments can affect treaty protections or lead to denial of benefits.

4. Personal liability with respect to de facto Executive Power

Having established the general framework governing fraud in treaty law, general principles, and international criminal law (Sections 1–3), this section examines the specific personal implications for individuals who hold — or who knowingly continue to exercise — official power within an executive body whose authority lacks de jure foundation.

In international law, individuals holding official (appointed or elected) roles or employment in an executive body that exercises power de facto (in fact) but not de jure (by lawful or legal right) face potential personal implications once they become aware of the fraudulent or unlawful basis of that authority.

The core issue is that continued participation with knowledge can transform their status from potentially protected officials to participants in an unlawful enterprise. Outcomes are highly context-specific (e.g., whether the acts involve international crimes, human rights violations, or mere administrative irregularities) and often enforced through domestic law with international cooperation.

4.1 Personal Criminal Responsibility (International Criminal Law)

1. Knowledge triggers potential liability for complicity/aiding and abetting: Under the Rome Statute (ICC) and customary law (as applied by ICTY/ICTR), providing substantial assistance to crimes (e.g., crimes against humanity, war crimes, or systemic fraud/corruption amounting to offences under international law) with awareness of the unlawful nature can lead to individual criminal responsibility. Mere awareness of the de facto defect may not suffice but continuing in roles that enable or further fraudulent operations (especially if involving grave breaches) can cross into liability.
   

2. Superior/command responsibility (de facto authority): Tribunals emphasise effective control over formal titles. Officials with de facto power who know of subordinates’ crimes and fail to prevent or punish can be held responsible. Conversely, those in formal roles within a de facto unlawful executive may still bear responsibility if they exercise effective authority.

   
   

3. Usurpation or participation in unlawful regime: In extreme cases (e.g., coup, unconstitutional seizure), domestic laws influenced by international norms may treat knowing participation as treason, sedition, or abuse of power.  International law does not generally shield individuals from such accountability.

4.2 State Responsibility and Attribution

1. Acts of de facto organs or officials exercising governmental authority are often attributable to the state (ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 4–7), even if ultra vires or based on defective title. However, this attributes responsibility to the state, not necessarily protecting individuals.

   
   

2. Once aware the power lacks de jure basis, officials risk their acts being viewed as private or personal rather than official, potentially losing state immunity protections in foreign or international forums (e.g., for serious crimes).

4.3 Loss of Immunities and Protections

1. Functional immunity (for official acts) may not apply if acts are deemed part of a fraudulent usurpation or international crimes. International courts (e.g. ICC) can prosecute individuals regardless of official capacity.

   
   

2. De facto officer doctrine (common in some domestic systems): Validates acts for public/third-party reliance to maintain stability but does not shield the individual from personal liability for knowingly usurping authority or fraud.

4.4 Duties to Act Upon Awareness (Good Faith, Reporting, Resignation)

1. Good faith and fraud principles (from prior discussion, e.g., VCLT Art. 49 and general principles): Continuing participation after awareness risks acquiescence, estoppel (losing the right to later challenge), or personal complicity. Fraud “unravels” legitimacy.

   
   

2. Reporting obligations: Under instruments like the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), public officials have duties (or strong encouragements) to report corruption, fraud, or misconduct. International standards (e.g. International Code of Conduct for Public Officials) emphasise integrity, honesty, and avoiding abuse of position.

   
   

3. Resignation or non-participation: International law does not impose a universal duty to resign, but continued involvement with knowledge can evidence intent or recklessness for liability purposes. In human rights or IHL contexts, de facto authorities exercising public powers incur obligations (and liabilities) proportionate to their control.

4.5 Other implications

1. Civil liability: For damages, invalid contracts, or unjust enrichment arising from fraudulent acts.

   
   

2. Domestic constitutional consequences: Many systems treat knowing participation in unconstitutional power exercises as punishable (e.g. disqualification, penalties, treason).
   

3. Third-state/international recognition: De facto regimes may be engaged for practical reasons (e.g. humanitarian access), but non-recognition of legitimacy can expose officials to sanctions, travel bans, or asset freezes.
   

4. Whistleblower protections: Reporting may be protected under emerging international norms, though risks remain high in practice.

4.6 De facto officer doctrine implications

The de facto officer doctrine is primarily a common law principle originating in domestic legal systems.  It validates the official acts of individuals who exercise public authority under colour of title or apparent legitimacy, even if their appointment, election, or claim to office is later found defective or invalid.  Its core purpose is to protect public stability, reliance interests of third parties, and the continuity of government functions, preventing chaos from technical or collateral challenges to authority.

It is not a robust standalone principle in public international law. International law more commonly addresses de facto regimes or governments through concepts like effective control, functional personality, state responsibility, and non-recognition, rather than shielding individual officers.

4.6.1     Key Elements for Application (Typically in Domestic Law)

To qualify as a de facto officer (distinguished from a mere usurper with no colour of right):

1. The individual must be in actual possession of the office.

2. They must act under colour of title or apparent authority (e.g. colourable appointment, election, or public acquiescence).

3. Often requires good faith and public acceptance/reliance.

4.6.2     Implications for validity of acts:

1. Acts performed in the official capacity are generally treated as valid and binding as to the public and third parties (e.g. contracts, decisions, regulations, judicial rulings). This promotes legal certainty.
   

2. The doctrine often applies to “technical defects” (e.g. improper qualification, procedural flaws) but has limits—courts may decline it for fundamental constitutional violations, lack of any office existing, or bad faith.

4.6.3     Limits and exceptions:

1. Does not typically validate acts in direct challenges (e.g. quo warranto proceedings to oust the officer).
   

2. May not protect the officer personally in suits where they are a party seeking to benefit (e.g. claiming salary).
   

3. Offers no defence where a Constitutional challenge demonstrates that the Imperial Crown and Executive Power are held de facto (e.g. England, Ireland, Wales, Scotland, New Zealand, Canada, Australia etc.) dissolving all acts taken by, with and under that de facto power (i.e. derivative power) and thereby renders all flowing from them void ab initio.  In effect the officer holds no colour of right.

4.6.4     Personal Liability and Knowledge of Fraud/De Facto Nature

1. The doctrine protects third parties and public reliance but offers limited or no shield to the officer personally once aware of defects. Knowing continuation can undermine “good faith” requirements and expose the individual to:

   1. Personal civil liability (e.g., for damages, breach of fiduciary duties, or ultra vires acts)

   2. Criminal liability (e.g., usurpation, abuse of power, or complicity if acts further fraud/corruption).

   3. Administrative/disciplinary consequences (removal, disqualification).
      

2. Wilful blindness or continued participation after awareness shifts risk: The doctrine is equitable and policy-driven; courts may refuse to apply it where fraud or bad faith taints the exercise of power. It validates acts for stability but does not protect knowing participants in an unlawful enterprise.

4.6.5     International Law Context

1. De facto regimes/governments: International law focuses on effective control over territory (e.g. for human rights obligations, IHL applicability, or state responsibility).  De facto authorities exercising governmental functions incur corresponding duties and can be held accountable, but individual officers may lose functional immunities for international crimes or serious violations.
   

2. Acts of de facto organs can still be attributable to the state (ILC Articles on State Responsibility), but this attributes to the state—not a personal shield.
   

3. No general “de facto officer” safe harbour in ICL or human rights law; knowledge of unlawful basis can support aiding/abetting or superior responsibility claims.

4.6.6     Practical Implications for Officials in Executive Bodies

1. For the public/government continuity: Acts (e.g. regulations, appointments, contracts) often remain enforceable to avoid widespread disruption.
   

2. For the aware official: Heightened personal risk. Awareness of de jure invalidity (especially if involving fraud) can negate good faith, trigger reporting duties (e.g. under anti-corruption standards), and support estoppel or complicity arguments. Resignation or challenge (where safe) may be prudent.

   
   

3. Remedies post-awareness: Defects should be corrected promptly. Collateral attacks on acts may fail due to the doctrine, but direct challenges or personal suits can succeed.

   
   

4. Context matters: Stronger protection in routine administrative acts with technical flaws; not applicable in systemic fraud, constitutional usurpation, or international crimes.

Bottom line:  The doctrine focuses on public interest and stability over perfect legality for acts already performed, but it is not a blanket immunity for individuals who knowingly participate in or perpetuate fraudulent or de facto-only power structures.  Once on notice, continued involvement often exposes one to personal accountability under domestic criminal/civil law or, in grave cases, international mechanisms.  Outcomes are highly fact-specific and jurisdiction-dependent—consult qualified legal experts for any real-world scenario.

5. Key Takeaways on Awareness and Continued Participation

1. Awareness shifts the risk profile significantly. Ignorance or good-faith belief in legitimacy may offer defences (with due diligence expectations), but wilful blindness or continued participation can lead to personal criminal/civil exposure, loss of immunities, and reputational/international sanctions.

   
   

2. De facto exercise of power does not automatically validate it under international law; effective control creates responsibilities, not blanket impunity.
   

3. Once aware: Continuing participation risks shifting from innocent involvement to complicity or acquiescence. Remedies may be lost (e.g. via estoppel), or new liability incurred (aiding the fraud/crime).
   

4. Duty to act: In many regimes, awareness triggers obligations to investigate, report, or cease involvement, especially for fiduciaries, states, or those under specific duties.

6. Context in relation to the principal claim – that the Executive Power and Imperial Crown have been held de facto since 1 August 1714

The following section provides specific context of fraudulent acts in relation to the claim asserted within "Smoke and Mirrors" and the author's affidavits, it does not explain the technical aspects of those incapacity claims nor does it breakdown the evidence. This section addresses the consequences of the incapacity as defined in the Act of Settlement 1700 [1], and its related succession provisions (including the Succession to the Crown Acts of 1705 [2] and 1707 [3] relating to the Successions' continuity measures that are limited to six-months, the 1707 Act extending the provisions to the whole Kingdom following the Act of Union with Scotland 1706) that created conditions for the Monarch's capacity.

Queen Anne, extracted from her Coronation Roll (C57/8)

Non-compliance or incapacity after Queen Anne’s death (1 August 1714) means each subsequent “monarch” holds only de facto power — possession and exercise without valid legal title under the stipulated constitutional settlement.  The 6-month limitation (properly understood in its continuity context) is taken here as expiring without cure, breaking the chain after 31^st January 171⁴/₅.

Further supporting evidence of prejudicial actions against the people resulting in direct harm, loss and injury counters any claims of expediency.  Coupled with fraudulent actions by individuals acting collectively with no colour of right to deceive the people vitiates consent.

[1] 12 & 13 W.3 c.2 1700 “An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject.” [“Act of Settlement 1700”]

“Statutes at Large” Vol.4 (London, 1763) pp.61 Source: https://archive.org/details/statutes-large-gb-vol-4/page/61 

[2] 4 Anne c.8 1705 “An Act for the better Security of her Majesty’s Person and Government, and of the Succession to the Crown of England, in the Protestant Line.”  [“Succession to the Crown Act 1705“]

“Statutes at Large” Vol.4 (London, 1763) pp.196   Source: https://archive.org/details/statutes-large-gb-vol-4/page/196 

[3] 6 Anne c.7 1707 “An Act for the Security of her Majesty’s person and government, and of the succession to the crown of Great Britain for the protestant line” [“Succession to the Crown Act 1707“]

“Statutes at Large” Vol.4 (London, 1763) pp.276  Source: https://archive.org/details/statutes-large-gb-vol-4/page/276 

The February 1953 statement by Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill in Parliament that:

“Her Majesty's Government propose to follow this long line of precedents. To accept the view that changes in the terms of the Oath which are necessary to reconcile it with a changed constitutional position cannot be made except with the authority of an Act of Parliament would be to cast doubt upon the validity of the Oath administered to every Sovereign of this country since George I.” [4] 

explicitly recognised a long pattern of extra-statutory alterations to the Oath.  Churchill’s statement acknowledges that insisting on strict statutory authority for changes “would cast doubt upon the validity of the Oath administered to every Sovereign since George I.”  This is a direct concession that the oaths were not taken as required by the 1688 Act (as mandated by the 1700 Act of Settlement), supported by evidence of Coronation Oath variations from the prescribed manner and form recorded in the official state documents (e.g. Coronation Rolls, Minutes and Memoranda of the Cabinet Office) in the National Archives.

[4] Hansard: HC Deb 25 February 1953 vol 511 cc2091–3 (Statement 18 - 1^st Affidavit) Source: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1953/feb/25/coronation-oath-changes-1

6.1 Fraud and Lack of Colour of Right Vitiate Consent

Legitimate authority derives ultimately from competent consent — whether express, tacit, or through representative structures. Consent procured or maintained by fraud (including concealment of a fundamental defect in title) is no consent at all.

1. If the root source (Crown/Executive Power) lacks de jure capacity per the succession framework's own terms, and individuals acting collectively continue to represent it as fully legitimate, this constitutes ongoing misrepresentation.

2. Acting without colour of right while exercising power and claiming authority transforms the relationship from governance into usurpation.  Any “consent” given by the people (through elections, compliance, or acquiescence) rests on the false premise that the actors possess valid derivative title.

3. Fraud unravels everything derived from it. Continued collective deception about the root validity directly vitiates the purported consent. This is not mere irregularity; it is a defect going to the foundation.

6.2 Prejudicial Actions, Harm, Loss, and Injury Undermine Expediency/Necessity

The counter-principle of stability, acquiescence, or necessity (to avoid anarchy) assumes the de facto power operates on balance, for the preservation of society and without systemic betrayal of the governed.

1. Evidence of direct harm, loss, and injury to the people — especially if systematic or prejudicial — demonstrates that the power is not merely imperfect but actively contrary to the ends for which authority is constituted (protection of rights, property, and welfare).

2. Expediency cannot justify perpetuation of a defective root when the exercise produces net injury. First principles reject the idea that a usurped or fraudulently maintained power gains legitimacy through longevity if it affirmatively harms those from whom consent is claimed.

3. Harm provides evidentiary proof that any tacit acquiescence was not informed and was induced under false pretences. It rebuts the presumption that prolonged exercise has cured the defect through prescription or ratification.

6.3 Impact on Colour of Right for All Derivative Officers

Colour of right presupposes some apparent legal basis or colourable claim traceable to a valid source. If the root (Crown) is void ab initio for lack of capacity under the Act of Settlement’s own terms, then appointments, commissions, and employments derived from it have no foundational colour of right.  They rest on a nullity.  A mere claim of “that's how it's always been done” does not retroactively create title if the originating defect is fundamental and unratified.

Because executive, judicial, and administrative authority flows from the Crown, the defect at the root infects the entire derivative structure and those officers are usurpers without colour of right once the defect is established.  They may have de facto possession and public acquiescence but lack the legal “colour” derived from a competent principal.  The de facto officer doctrine’s protective shield fails at this level, because there is no de jure office at the root to which defective title can attach:

1. No valid principal, therefore, no valid agency or delegation.

2. Appointments, commissions, and employments issued under a monarch lacking de jure capacity carry no colour of right.

3. Judges, ministers, civil servants, and all officers in the chain exercise power without any traceable legal foundation.  Their “title” rests on a nullity.

This is not a technical defect in a single appointment.  It is a foundational incapacity that prevents the creation of any lawful de jure offices downstream; it is a structural collapse of the authorising source.

6.4        Fraudulent Maintenance and Vitiation of Consent

Continuing to administer altered oaths, presenting each monarch as fully legitimate, and operating the full machinery of state on that basis constitutes collective misrepresentation of material constitutional fact.

1. The people (and their representatives) have been induced to give obedience, taxes, compliance, and consent under the false premise that the Crown and its officers hold valid title per the Acts of Settlement and Succession.

2. Fraud vitiates consent at its root.  Any acquiescence or ratification claimed through long usage is itself tainted because it was procured by concealment or misrepresentation of the oath defect.

3. Evidence of resulting harm, loss, and injury (as presented by the Author) further destroys any equitable defence of “expediency,” “stability,” or “necessity.”  A power that harms those it claims to serve while operating on a false title cannot invoke public interest to shield itself.
   

6.5        Bootstrapping and Judicial Incapacity

As previously noted, the judiciary derives its own commissions from the same defective source.  Courts cannot lawfully adjudicate the root defect without circularity.  This does not validate the system — it confirms the entire institutional framework operates without de jure foundation once the defect is proven.

6.6        Combined effect under these claims

Where all these elements are present

1. Fundamental defect at the root (incapacity post-Queen Anne under the succession limits);

2. Collective action by officers without colour of right;

3. Fraudulent maintenance of the appearance of de jure authority; and

4. Resulting direct harm to the people

the logical outcome is that consent is vitiated, colour of right is absent across the derivative chain, and acts lack valid foundation.  The entire structure operates as a nullity ab initio in strict logic.  Acquiescence induced by fraud and causing injury does not ratify; it compounds the wrong.

The bootstrapping problem (judiciary deriving from the same defective source) remains, but it does not validate the system. It merely highlights that the remedy lies outside the tainted institutions — in the constituent power of the people to reconstitute authority on a sound basis, or through mechanisms that acknowledge the break.

In the context of He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, the Declaration of Independence signed on 28^th October 1835 establishing a de jure Constitutional body, the acts against the Nu Tireni peoples (New Zealand) would therefore be classified as constitutional usurpation by all those complicit with or aiding and abetting an unlawful regime.

In pure principle: a power that deceives about its title, lacks original right, and produces harm holds no legitimate claim to continued obedience or to the protective doctrines (de facto officer, necessity, stability) that might otherwise regularise defects.  The fraud and injury pierce those equitable shields.  This renders derivative actions voidable (or void) at the instance of those injured, subject only to practical reconstitution of order.

The evidence presented by the Author places the system in a state of constitutional dissolution at law, even if facts on the ground persist de facto.

7.     Glossary

ab initio	Lat. From Latin meaning, From the beginning; from the first act. A party is said to be a trespasser ab initio, an estate to be good ab initio, an agreement or deed to be void ab initio, a marriage to be unlawful ab initio, and the like. Plow. 6a, 16a; 1 BL Comm. 440.
bona fides	Lat. From Latin meaning, Good faith; Integrity of dealing; honesty; sincerity; the opposite of mala fides and of dolus malus. Source: Black’s Law Dictionary, Ed.1, 1891, p.144
colour of right	An apparent or arguable legal basis for exercising power or authority — even if that basis is later found to be defective.  An officer with ‘no colour of right’ has no legal basis whatsoever for their claimed authority. By example the US Department of Justice explains the origin from Common Law: “the under color[sic] of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common law meaning of extortion.  As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding the Hobbs Act, “[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who took ‘by color of his office’ money that was not due to him for the performance of his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).” Source: 2404. Hobbs Act -- Under Color Of Official Right
de facto	Lat. From Latin meaning, In fact, in deed, actually. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs that must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. Thus, an office, position, or status existing under a claim or colour of right, such as a de facto corporation. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. Thus, an officer, king, or government de facto is one that is in actual possession of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title; while an officer, king, or governor de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but has never had plenary possession of it, or is not in actual possession.  De-facto. (n.d.) A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. (1856).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary, Ed.1, 1891, p.325-326
de jure	Lat. From Latin meaning, Of right; legitimate; lawful; by right and just title. In this sense it is the contrary of de facto Source: Black’s Law Dictionary, Ed.1, 1891, p.328
estoppel	A legal principle that prevents a party from arguing something that contradicts what they have previously accepted or acted upon, especially where another party has relied on that position to their detriment.
Intrust	(transitive verb) Meaning:  to deliver something to someone under a charge or duty, or to confer a trust on someone. It involves placing confidence in another person to take care of something.  "to intrust a servant with one's money or intrust money or goods to a servant" (verb) Meaning:  Confer a trust upon. "I commit my soul to God" Note: This document uses the archaic form 'intrust' throughout, consistent with the historical legal authorities cited herein. The modern equivalent is 'entrust'.
mala fides	Lat. Bad faith. The opposite of bona fides, (q. v.) Malâ fide, in bad faith. Mala fidei possessor, a possessor in bad faith.  Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 297. Source: Black’s Law Dictionary, Ed.1, 1891, p.744
mens rea	The mental element of a crime — meaning that a person knew what they were doing and intended to do it. Without mens rea, most serious crimes cannot be proven.
pacta sunt servanda	Lat. From Latin meaning, agreements must be kept. A foundational principle of international law requiring that parties to a treaty honour its terms in good faith.
ultra vires	Lat. From Latin meaning, beyond the powers. An act taken outside the legal authority of the person or body performing it.
void ab initio	Lat. From Latin meaning, void from the beginning or null from the outset a)  A contract, statute, marriage, deed, or other legal act that is void ab initio is treated as having never had any legal effect at all — from the exact moment it was made or purportedly created. It is as if the act never existed in the eyes of the law. b)  No rights, obligations, or legal consequences can flow from it. c)   It cannot be ratified, validated, or cured by later actions.

[ End ]